15 January 2013
Until the next election in 2014, Hungarian politics, at least superficially, will look the same as before. The opposition will seek to reverse their decline and reintroduce their particular form of government, although it is unlikely that the shape of their policies will be known for some time, if at all.
Indeed, for some on the liberal-left in Hungary, having a detailed programme is an electoral albatross and not really indicative of modern-day politics, which tend to be short on detail and long on strategic vision. Nevertheless, the MSZP, LMP and Jobbik will look and feel the same as they are today.
However, there are hidden contours to Hungarian politics which are very much in evidence – albeit in a hazy form – but which few citizens are truly aware of and that is the struggle between modern political liberal orthodoxy and conservatism which transcends routine party political conflict.
Have you ever wondered why the government of Viktor Orbán has been so vilified by the EU, the western media and international finance? The answer lies not in individual Fidesz policies per se but rather concern that Orbán’s election victory in 2010 signalled a possible containment of liberalism in Europe, a questioning of so-called enlightenment values and the creation of a rallying point for other such-minded peoples.
Either by design or default, official Hungarian state policy is front and centre in a wider struggle to curb the excesses of liberalism, including in economics and finance, business practice, education, the role of the media, the relationship between state and religion, the limitations of individual rights and the relevance of history.
The debate over the new constitution, for example, typified the thinking of the Orbán government. The document clearly placed Hungary and its people in a historical context and reinforced the linkage between the current generation and past and future generations. It underlined traditional concepts such as the definition of marriage and the influence of religion.
In the economic field, the Orbán government demonstrated a jaundiced view of international finance and global financial management and regulation. The massive corruption and financial scandals associated with the MSZP and Liberal governments from Medgyessy to Gyurcsány were indicative of a global financial system and shady business practices which had ripped the heart out of financial prudence and favoured unregulated markets and hedge speculation. The collapse of the markets in 2008 provided evidence of a system that had accumulated so much debt that future generations will have to pay the price of their parent’s profligacy – a clear betrayal of generational linkage.
Of course this economic failure has led to the liberal elite in Brussels to demand ever-closer political integration, irrespective of the lack of political legitimacy for such a move, as a way to prop up the Euro. Hungary is currently being punished by the EU for its unwillingness to buy into the liberal utopia and might incur further punishment if it does not bend to EU diktat. Such actions by the EU are not to redress unorthodox fiscal policy but unorthodox political thinking. What kind of democracy are we seeing here?
In terms of social policy, the political opposition have singularly failed to spell out a coherent view of a modern Hungarian society in terms of a social contract, the most effective way to educate young people, including the financial aspect, the role of woman in society and supporting an aging population. This is not surprising as these are complex and challenging issues. However, supporting enhanced minority rights and equality agendas are all well and good but the reality is that these are secondary issues to a society that is keen to square the circle of low productivity but high consumer demands or having a tax system that acknowledges wealth generation as much as the benefits culture. One doesn’t need a debate on Hayek versus Keynes to realise that Orbán’s Hungary is currently struggling with liberal orthodoxy and the election of 2014 will tell if the Fidesz version is more attractive to Hungarian voters.
One of the reasons why these hidden contours remain hidden is that the Hungarian media is either unwilling or unable to tear away the veil and expose these social, economic and political fault lines. It’s a sad fact that the quality of Hungarian journalism, particularly economic and political, is very poor. Young and inexperienced journalists rub shoulders with former communist hacks and the result is an inability to venture beneath the superficial. By and large, the liberal-leaning orthodoxy is all too present in Hungarian media analysis of current events and the public is rarely offered a different interpretation of events.
It is too early to say how these contours will feature in the political discourse of 2013. They are ever present but rarely recognised as such. However, it is possible that the Orbán government might open up this particular ‘Pandora’s Box’ as a way to expose the opposition’s reluctance to go beyond orthodoxy and give the Hungarian electorate a real debate on their future.