EU IMMIGRATION QUOTAS: THE IMPACT ON HUNGARY

11 May 2015

In the coming days, the European Commission is preparing to table a proposal that will see a shake-up of the Union’s immigration rules and lead to a requirement that refugees reaching Europe should be spread more equally amongst Member States and not – as the current rules state – in the country in which they first arrive in the Union.

This is a fundamental change in policy and one, which is not universally liked by many states. Several countries, including the UK and Hungary, are wary of the implications for national sovereignty that such measures would entail. Indeed, I would suggest that such a move will undoubtedly feature large in the British debate about continued membership of the EU in the lead-up to the proposed referendum in 2017.

The rationale behind such a move is not without some merit. As the explosion of refugees from the Maghreb region – primarily generated by political instability, economic dislocation and violence – shows little sign of abating, the impact of such migration falls hardest on those EU states closest to the problem. States like Italy, Spain and Greece are desperately keen to find some way to alleviate the problem and of course Germany and France are similarly anxious that the steady move of such refugees north and west does not end on their doorstep.

Quite separate from the economic cost of managing these refugees is the cost of trying to integrate them into society. At a time when the Eurozone is practically stagnant, being seen to provide additional social benefits, including basic housing, healthcare and education to non-citizens is not an attractive proposition for politicians. Such costs are not negligible when you consider the extent of poverty and unemployment within existing communities.

Arguments will be made and rightly so that the management of the refugee problem is as much a humanitarian issue as an economic one. The seemingly endless TV clips of refugees drowning or clinging to unseaworthy vessels in the Mediterranean Sea are perilously close to making viewers immune to the extent of the suffering endured by ‘the wretched of the earth’. It is little wonder that several voices in Europe are keen to use force to prevent people traffickers from exploiting and benefiting from such callous disregard for human life.

Yet those who would argue against the imposition of refugee quotas should be heard. The right of a nation state to decide to whom it offers residency is a right and practice that should not be abandoned lightly or for short-term expediency. This is a fundamental component of statehood. Furthermore, some states are less able than others to support such a gesture and being compelled to bear the cost of integrating sizeable numbers of refugees without the consent of existing communities is frankly, undemocratic.

Concern too has also been raised about problems of social integration of refugees. The recent problems in France and Germany regarding the integration of migrant communities should give Europeans cause to pause and think about the longer-term issues of social cohesion when it comes to managing cultural drivers, which can sometimes generate friction between communities.

Hungary will need to engage on this debate within the EU – there can be no hiding places.  It will also have to make a clear and cogent case in defence of whatever position it eventually adopts. For the time being, Hungary, as a Schengen state, is already embroiled in managing the consequences of complex immigration rules and regulations. The influx of transit refugees from Kosovo heading towards Austria and Germany has already underlined the fact that Hungary is incapable of adequately managing its borders.

Yet the possible implications for Hungary run somewhat deeper. In terms of social cohesion, Hungary already faces a significant challenge in improving Roma integration into mainstream society.  Furthermore, Budapest has a unique responsibility to those ethnic Hungarians in neighbouring states and as such has already accepted significant numbers of new citizens, especially into the jobs market although this is far less onerous than the dire predictions generated by some politicians a few years ago.

Similarly, given the security concerns associated with the refugee communities from Libya in particular, Hungary must ask if it has the security capabilities to monitor potential violent extremists lurking within refugee communities. Threats of attack on Europe by ‘Islamic State’ so-called ‘sleeper cells’ – suggested by IS to have already infiltrated refugee groups – should not be dismissed as complete fantasy even if the scale of such a threat remains low. In raising such concerns, Hungary and other states should not be pilloried as either mean-spirited or racist but rather demonstrating a higher level of sensitivity to social cohesion as a time when many of our multicultural policies are failing. Indeed, immigrant communities are often the targets of intimidation and abuse and Hungary’s law enforcement community must be similarly capable of protecting their lives, property and interests.

Where then should Hungary stand on this impending debate?

First and foremost, Hungary must not be bullied into adopting policies that are not in the interests of the Hungarian people. Any decision to shift the right to determine national immigration policy from the state to Brussels should be resisted.

Nevertheless, Hungary can offer support to help alleviate this crisis. There is no reason why Hungary cannot provide qualified border guards to support other member states or FRONTEX policing of the Schengen borders, although it would do well to reinforce its own borders at the same time. Equally, Hungary could offer to provide temporary shelter to small numbers of refugees but which involve the acceptance of workfare and education and training as a compulsory element of their stay, including those skills which might help future reintegration into their own or Hungary’s society.

A key component of this ‘adoption’ policy is to conduct this effort in close cooperation with the local Church communities and law enforcement agencies. The former have tremendous experience of supporting Roma communities and for refugees from cultures either unfamiliar or hostile to over secular societies, this might be no bad thing. Regarding the latter, having refugee communities work with the local law enforcement structures can help overcome barriers of suspicion and separation and possibly provide early warning of friction between mainstream communities and those of the newcomers.

Finally, Hungary should be prepared intellectually to question some facets of the EU’s integrated border management system. Many of the early premises of the system remain valid but some are no longer fit for purpose. Perhaps Viktor Orbán could offer to host an informal EU summit on what the future of Schengen and immigration might imply today?