VIKTOR ORBÁN AND THE ILLIBERAL STATE

11 August 2014

Viktor Orbán’s recent speech to ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania on 26 July 2014, in which he mentioned Hungary’s movement towards the creation of a ‘workfare’ state – not per se built on current western liberal models – but rather a pragmatic response to social and economic developments, has been met by a somewhat hysterical and ill-informed reaction by Hungary’s liberals and their foreign supporters.

Actually, if you read the ‘Tusnád’ speech carefully, you will find an articulate and informed assessment of a debate, which is current in intellectual and academic circles around the world.  Orbán quite clearly has read ‘The Fourth Revolution: The Global Race to Reinvent the State’ by John Mickelthwait and Adrian Wooldridge, two writers associated with the ‘Economist’ who are helping to foster a debate on the form of effective government in the future given that the current welfare state model cannot be sustained.

The speech and the response are interesting on different levels. At one level, the decision by Hungarian liberals to take their complaint to Brussels is a slap in the face for democracy in Hungary but also reinforces the view that liberals are on the back-foot politically, socially and economically. Liberalism in Hungary is dead – they have nothing to offer society other than more regulation in the name of individual rights, which in fact generally clash with the rights of others. Regulating peoples’ behaviour to enforce perceived ‘equality’ has been the hallmark of modern liberalism in Hungary and the EU and the electorate simply won’t buy it any more.

Complaining to Brussels also suggests that the EU should and can enforce political liberal orthodoxy amongst member states. However, this in itself is a dangerous notion, especially at a time when the EU is itself under criticism for its inability to become more democratic and accountable to the people of Europe. In terms of Hungarian politics, Orbán is more of a democrat than many of his opponents.

On another level, the speech homed in on a very real and present problem – how to ensure a modern democracy can afford the spiralling costs of providing welfare and employment stimulus in a resource-tight economy? Again, Orbán seems familiar with the competing economic visions of Keynes and Hayek and the implications for modern political economy. During his last term in office, 2010-14, Orbán initiated a series of unorthodox measures to reduce government debt and public borrowing as well as stimulating work for the long-term unemployed. These policies were not without their critics but in short, the policies worked. They worked, not only due to their inherent effectiveness but also in part due to the fact that the economic orthodoxy expounded by critics was in fact the same policies, which led to economic meltdown in 2008.

Orbán points out in his speech that Hungary is not alone in seeking to come to terms with this underlying and simmering crisis.  He points to similar debates in the USA and in the UK.  Yet his critics, especially in the USA, are unable to see anything but a tyrant – the traditional default position of the ‘Princeton set’ and the liberal establishment. Should Americans in particular complain about Hungary when the USA struggles to create a national budget and regularly shuts down government?

Where Hungary goes under a ‘workfare’ system of government is intriguing as it is vague. What does it mean?  What it might mean, however, is that welfare and benefits might become divorced from ‘entitlement’ and that government funding might lean towards supporting families who support themselves.This is unlikely to suggest that the poor and disadvantaged will not be provided for but this provision will be less likely to be supported by high taxation.

Going against the grain, especially as a trailblazer is never easy for a politician. However, the Tusnád speech suggests that Orbán has become informed about the future of government, global economics and the possible ways to meet the challenges of the future. The fact that he has suggested that future models of governance might be ‘illiberal’ is not an issue of freedom but of classic political philosophy.